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ABSTRACT
In this paperwe examine towhat extent developing countries exportmore as a result of
having the official Least Developed Country (LDC) status. We estimate a gravity model
of trade over the period 1973–2013, in which identification is achieved by exploiting
the particularities and asymmetries of ‘inclusion’ and ‘graduation’ criteria of LDC sta-
tus. As mechanisms through which LDCs might benefit, we evaluate the effectiveness
of individual trade preference schemes for LDCs of the European Union, United States,
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Turkey and the impact of LDC sta-
tus on exports. We find that first, individual trade preference regimes are not always
beneficial in terms of increased export values. Export promoting effects are found for
the individual schemes of somedeveloped countries and some sectors. Second, a coun-
try’s official designation as a LDC is associated with higher aggregated exports. This
is particularly the case for LDCs that export agricultural goods and light manufactur-
ing products, including textiles and leather after 1990. Third, the positive effect of
LDC status is significant and sizable even when controlling for specific trade prefer-
ence schemes suggesting that there are other benefits of LDC status that play a role
in promoting exports.
KEYWORDS Least developed countries; LDC; trade preferences; gravity model; generalized system of
preferences; GSP
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1. Introduction
In 1971, the UN Committee for Development Planning (later renamed the UN Com-
mittee for Development Policy, CDP) created a list of what they called least developed
countries (LDCs) to designate countries that suffered from low per-capita incomes and
severe structural handicaps. The list initially included 24 countries but has changed over
time as new countries have been included and others have graduated from the desig-
nation. The CDP designates which countries are listed as LDCs based on criteria that
include a set of economic and social variables.1 The purpose of the designation was so
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that these countries would receive support from developed countries, as well as mul-
tilateral agencies, to further their economic development, including trade preferences,
concessional aid, reduced UN contributions and support for participation in UN activ-
ities. The LDC category received increasing acceptance in trade discussions, especially
since the late 1980s when it became the only official country grouping recognized by the
WTO deserving special support.
Similarly, industrialized countries (ICs) have been granting trade preferences to
developing countries since the early 1970s. These unilateral preferences, known as the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), are upheld by international trade law and
have been described in the enabling clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1979 as part of the Tokyo Round of the GATT. GSP allows ICs to
apply different tariffs to different categories of trading partners (developing countries
(DCs) and least developed countries (LDCs)), without violating Article I of the GATT,
which requires non-discriminatory and equal (most favored nations (MFN)) treatment
of trading partners. Such preferences can be part of the GSP, but they can also be granted
via specific trade preference schemes, such as the EU’s ‘Everything by Arms’ Initiative
(EBA), which provides unilateral preferences to LDCs, or the ‘Africa Growth Oppor-
tunity Act’ (AGOA), which provides unilateral trade preferences to African countries,
including all African LDCs. As the number of schemes with preferences for LDCs in
recent years has increased, and asmore poor countries are included in global value chains
– especially in textiles, garments, other lightmanufacturing, and some agricultural prod-
ucts – the advantages of LDC status may have increased. On the other hand, multilateral
trade liberalization and the end of multi-fibre agreement have led to preference erosion
for LDCs, potentially lowering their export opportunities.
Even though LDC status and its associated trade preferences may seem to be advan-
tageous for developing countries, their effectiveness is unclear. According to a survey
carried out by the United Nations (DESA/CDP 2012), LDCs consider the unpredictabil-
ity of non-reciprocal preferences and the administrative costs involved, as deterrents to
export-oriented investment in their countries. They argue that the preferences gained
from LDC status are discretionary, not contractually guaranteed, and hence could be
withdrawn at any time by the importer. Given the uncertainty surrounding the prefer-
ences and costs when dealing with GSP preferences in general, it is important to assess
the effectiveness of these preferences.While there is literature on the effectiveness of indi-
vidual preference schemes (see below), to our knowledge, there is no literature (except
for a recent simulation carried out by UNCTAD 2016)2 that examines the total impact
of LDC status on the exports of these countries. We study the impact of these preference
schemes, and of other support that LDCsmight receive to improve their exports, includ-
ing aid to improve infrastructure, measures to promote foreign direct investment, and
other trade-enhancing schemes.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of LDC status on promoting exports of these
countries and how the impact has changed over time for different groups of LDCs. To
identify a causal effect of LDC status on exports, we exploit peculiarities and asymme-
tries in the inclusion and graduation criteria of LDC designation. More specifically, we
compare LDCs to non-LDC developing countries that have similar LDC criteria values
as LDCs but are not on the list due to historical contingencies, asymmetric inclusion,
and the graduation criteria.3 In particular, there is a large set of non-LDCs that do not
meet the inclusion criteria but are not well enough off to meet the graduation criteria if
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they were on the list. In other words, if they had been placed on the list due to some his-
torical contingency (e.g. being among the poorest countries in 1971), they would still be
on it today. Hence, this comparable set of non-LDCs serves as a good control group for
countries on the list. To improve the identification further, we include, in our preferred
specification, trade-pair (dyadic) fixed effects aswell as exporter-time and importer-time
fixed effects (using a six-year window) so that identification is driven by switchers in the
LDC category within the six-year window.
The current group of 484 LDCs (listed in Table 1) is largely heterogeneous, including
countries that mainly export goods that are already duty free at the MFN-level, and oth-
ers that could benefit from trade preferences by joining specific schemes such as GSP+.
It includes landlocked countries, very small island states and countries that are heavily
commodity-dependent. These characteristics and groupings are also examined in our
analysis. We additionally evaluate the impact of IC trade preferences on LDC exports
focusing on the effectiveness of trade preference schemes of the European Union (EU),
United States (US), Canada, Japan, Australia, NewZealand, Norway, and Turkey. Finally,
Table 1. List of LDCs and control group list.
LDC Country Inclusion Graduation LDC Country Inclusion
No switchers:
Afghanistan 1971 Malawi 1971
Benin 1971 Mali 1971
Bhutan 1971 Nepal 1971
Burkina Faso 1971 Niger 1971
Burundi 1971 Rwanda 1971
Chad 1971 Somalia 1971
Ethiopia 1971 Sudan 1971
Guinea 1971 Uganda 1971
Haiti 1971 Tanzania 1971
Lao P. Dem. Rep. 1971 Yemen 1971
Lesotho 1971
Switchers with trade data before and after the switch:
The Maldives 1971 2011 Vanuatu 1985
Central African R. 1975 Kiribati 1986
Gambia 1975 Myanmar 1987
Cape Verde 1977 2007 Madagascar 1991
Guinea-Bissau 1981 Zambia 1991
Sierra Leone 1982 Senegal 2000
Togo 1982
Switchers with no trade data either before and/or after the switch:
Botswana 1971 1994 Mozambique 1988
Samoa 1971 2014 Liberia 1990
Bangladesh 1975 Dem. Rep. Congo 1991
Comoros 1977 Solomon Islands 1991
Djibouti 1982 Eritrea 1994
Equatorial Guinea 1982 2017 Cambodia 1991
Sao Tome and Principe 1982 Angola 1994
Tuvalu 1986 Timor-Leste 2003
Mauritania 1986 South Sudan 2012
Off-LDC list countries (control group):
Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Coted’Ivoire, Ghana,Guyana,Honduras, India, Iraq, Kenya,Mongolia,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Swaziland, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
Note: Source: UNDP. Big exporters and countries that have diversified their exports are in bold. Small island states
are underlined.
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we analyze the impact of trade preferences on total exports, exports without oil and
minerals, exports of raw materials, agricultural exports and manufactured exports (fur-
ther differentiating between chemical goods, machinery and transport goods, and light
manufacturing products, which includes textiles and leather).
The most important difference relative to previous studies is that we specifically
include LDC status in our analysis while studying the link between trade preferences and
bilateral trade by differentiating by product groups and sectors and focus therefore on the
specifics of a particular preference scheme.5 We also account for time-varying and time-
invariant country characteristics, country-pair heterogeneity and take into account other
bilateral time-variant factors that affect exports, such as free trade agreements (FTAs),
currency unions (CUs) and commonWTOmembership, following more recent studies
(Herz and Wagner 2011; Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso 2016).
The main results show that official LDC status is associated with an increase in
exports, in terms of total exports and agricultural exports. When exploring heterogene-
ity across sectors and different individual GSP schemes, we find positive effects for only
some goods and the GSP schemes of particular importers. We also find that LDC status
leads to higher exports when controlling for specific trade preference schemes suggest-
ing that the benefits of that status extend beyond a specific trade preference scheme.
These positive effects are only visible after 1990, a period where we find some evidence
that LDC status also led to higher exports in light manufacturing products, including
textiles and leather.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the closely
related literature and Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy, the model specification,
and describes the data and its sources. The main results are presented in Section 4 and
Section 5 concludes.
2. Trade preferences, LDC status and developing countries’ exports
Trade preferences under the GSP program are granted not only by the so-called QUAD
countries – EU, US, Japan, and Canada – but also by Australia, New Zealand, and Nor-
way, among others.6 A common feature of all preference systems is that GSP preferences
can be withdrawn, suspended, or limited vis-à-vis countries and products.
There are several studies evaluating the effect of GSPs granted by single ICs to DCs.
We focus on the results of studies for the US, Japan, and EU. Frazer and Van Biese-
broeck (2010) examine the AGOA scheme – the US trade preference scheme for African
countries – using data for the period 1998–2006 from 207 countries and 5120 products
(6-digit). They find a large, positive, and statistically significant impact of AGOA on
US imports from AGOA countries. Receiving AGOA treatment increases US imports,
on average, by 13%. Imports of apparel, agricultural goods, minerals, petroleum and
manufacturing products increase by 42%, 8%, 16.6%, 73.5% and 14.6% respectively.
Ito (2013) evaluates the impact on LDCs of duty-free quota free (DFQF) access
granted by Japan. Japan began granting LDCs DFQF access in 2000 and accelerated
the policy after 2005. Ito (2013) finds that LDCs did not benefit from DFQF access
to the Japanese market in general. The tariff lines, which were granted zero tariffs and
substantial preference margins over non-LDC countries, cover products not imported
by Japan, although total imports from LDCs to Japan increased. Ito interprets these
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negative results as suggestive evidence that tariff barriers are small obstacles for trade rel-
ative to the challenges posed by infrastructure, non-tariff barriers, distance, and cultural
differences.7
Thelle et al. (2015) analyze EU trade preference scheme using import data from 176
countries (133 DCs and 43 OECD or high-income oil-exporting countries) and 3408
products over a period of 18 years (1995–2012). They use three different trade prefer-
ence measures: (i) tariff margins (tMFN−tTP),8 (ii) preference ratios (1−tTP/tMFN), and
(iii) existence of trade preferences, i.e. a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
a trade preference scheme exists. This latter measure has the advantage to capture not
only the impact of tariffs but that of quotas, non-tariff trade barriers, and rules of origins
as well, which may be important aspects of trade preferences not captured by tariffs. In
line with the results by Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano (2014), Thelle
et al. (2015) find that, on average, trade preferences granted by EU countries significantly
increase DC exports in nominal terms. In particular, they find that enjoying trade pref-
erences boosts DC exports by about 6% (impact of the preference dummy), that a 100%
elimination of tariffs (the preferential tariff becomes zero) would also increase exports
of all products by 6%, on average, and that a 1% increase in the tariff margin increases
DC exports by about 0.3% over a period of 18 years.9
Econometric evidence on the role of trade preferences for DC exports is mixed. In
many cases, studies examining the impact of trade preference schemes on DC aggregate
exports use trade preference indicators (GSPs), that is, dummies that indicate whether
a trade preference system is at work or not. A number of empirical studies in the 1980s
and 1990s show that GSPs underperformed, with only a modest increase in the exports
of beneficiary countries, some of which could be attributed to trade diversion (Brown
1989; Sapir and Lundberg 1984;Whalley 1990).More recent studies byHerz andWagner
(2011) and Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano (2014) examine a number
of trade preference schemes and also find mixed results.
Herz and Wagner (2011) analyze 184 countries over the period 1953–2006 using
annual trade data. They use Pseudo PoissonMaximumLikelihood (PPML) estimation10
to estimate a gravitymodel of trade that includes year and country-pair fixed effects. The
overall results point to an export hampering effect of trade preferences.More specifically,
the authors show that trade preferences (GSP scheme) are associated with 4% lower
exports for DCs on average. However, the impact of trade preferences on DC exports
is positive and statistically significant if the scheme existed for less than 10 years but
turns negative and statistically significant for trade relations lasting between one and two
decades (medium to long run). Herz andWagner (2011) argue that preference-granting
countries benefit in the short-run since GSP-receiving countries import intermediate
inputs mainly from GSP-granting countries, supposedly due to the recipient country’s
goodwill or improved relations. They also emphasize that trade preferences seem to
have distortive effects in DCs in the long run when strict or complicated rules of ori-
gin lead DCs to export under most favored nation (MFN) tariffs rather than under GSP
preferences.
In contrast to these findings, Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, andMartínez-Serrano (2014)
provide evidence of an export promoting effect of trade preferences for DCs. They use a
panel data set of 177 countries over the period 1960–2008 to estimate a gravity model of
trade in levels and in first differences, including controls for unobserved heterogene-
ity and multilateral resistance.11 A Heckman 2-stage model and a PPML model are
also estimated. Their results show positive and statistically significant average effects of
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trade preferences, ranging from a cumulative impact of 26% after 4 years to 88% after
8 years. They find an impact of 91%12 when the model is estimated using first differ-
ences. Using other estimation techniques, namely a Heckman approach and PPML, the
impact is reduced to 39%, and 27%, respectively. A simulation study byUNCTAD (2016)
finds that the removal of LDC-specific preferential treatment by G20 countries would
cause a loss that is, on average, equivalent to a 3%–4% reduction in merchandise export
revenues.
Whereas general GSP preferences are open to most developing countries, prefer-
ence providers typically offer more generous schemes exclusively to LDCs. These LDC
schemes were introduced in the early 2000s as a response to the call for developed
countries to provide duty- and quota-free access to LDCs. In addition to general GSP
preferences and LDC preferences, many ICs also provide preferences to other groups of
DCs or regions, either within the GSP or as separate schemes.
Among the specific schemes, the EU offers the EBA initiative with ‘zero’ tariffs for
LDCs covering all products except for arms and ammunition and also the slightly less
preferential GSP+ tariff for vulnerable countries, which respect human rights and other
international conventions. The US system of preferences for LDCs also works through
different schemes in addition to the general GSP scheme, including the AGOA and the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), which include almost all LDCs in the
region (but are not limited to them). Duty-free access is excluded for oil, certain tex-
tiles and apparel and some leather products under US-GSP. Under AGOA, footwear,
luggage, handbags, watches, and flatware can be exported duty-free to the US since
December 2000, subject to specific certification on the rules of origin. Textiles can be
exported duty-free but not quota-free to the US. Apart from the Generalized Preferen-
tial Tariff (GPT), Canada offers two further non-reciprocal regimes: the Commonwealth
Caribbean Countries Tariff (CCCT) and the Least Developed Country Tariff (LDCT).
The Japanese GSP system is comprised of a list of agricultural items that are eligible for
GSP, and a list of industrial goods that are ineligible. The Japanese system provides duty-
free, as well as reduced-duty access under GSP to developing countries. All the textile
and clothing products from LDCs are DFQF since 2001 in Japan. It is worth noting that
Japan has adopted a special graduation policy, whereby a particular country can lose
its GSP benefits for a specific product when the beneficiary is considered to be inter-
nationally competitive and Japan has also in fact withdrawn benefits as countries have
graduated from LDC status.13
As already mentioned in the introduction, the uncertainty and costs associated with
the preference regimes has limited its use and effectiveness. Brenton (2003) claims that
for most LDCs, the value of EU preferences is below 5% of total exports (see Table A.1
in the online Appendix). The low value of preferences can be especially ascribed to the
strict rules of origin (RoO)14 and the administrative burden of filling out forms when
claiming trade preferences (Gitli 1995; Bjuggren and Hanson Lundström 2012; Gradeva
and Martínez-Zarzoso 2016). Bjuggren and Hanson Lundström (2012) show that the
US’s more generous rules of origin has led to greater imports from developing countries,
whereas the EU’s stricter RoO leads to lower utilization rates of preferences in textiles
and clothing trade of developing countries. Next to RoO, non-tariff barriers to trade in
the formof technical standards act as another trade impediment (Khorana 2007;Mohan,
Khorana, and Choudhury 2012). Moreover, it is often argued that many LDCs lack pro-
ductive or administrative capacity to make use of these preferences (Huchet-Bourdon,
Lichitz, and Rousson 2009; UNCTAD 2016).
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While the trade benefits provided to LDCs are variable, have changed over time, and
can easily be withdrawn, it is worth noting that countries that are classified as LDCs usu-
allymaintain this status formany years and graduation has only happened in a few cases.
Since 1971, when the term and category of LDCs was created, the United Nations (UN)
has granted LDC countries (at present 48) a range of preferences and asked member
states to provide special trade privileges to this group. These unilateral trade privileges
to LDCs are compatible withWTO rules, which recognize the LDC category as the only
official country grouping. The criteria for being classified as an LDC have been period-
ically revised and are based on three mainly social and economic outcome measures:
per capita income, human resources, and economic vulnerability. Every three years, a
so-called tri-annual review is conducted by the CDP to decide which countries should
be included and which countries should graduate from the list. Since its creation in the
1970s, only five countries have graduated15 (Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde in 2007, the
Maldives in 2011, Samoa in 2014, and Equatorial Guinea in 2017; see also UNCTAD
2016). Only 24 countries were on the initial list (1971), with 5 countries added in the
1970s, 12 in the 1980s, 8 in the 1990s, and 3 in the 2000s (see Table 1 for these countries
and their exact dates). The precise criteria for inclusion and graduation, and how we use
them in our identification strategy, are discussed below.
As argued above, however, LDC status may influence a country’s exports through
other mechanisms. These may range from higher and more concessional aid flows, spe-
cific aid-for-trade programs, support for foreign direct investment (FDI), which may
boost exports, or greater goodwill in the enforcement of existing trade regulations.
Indeed, LDCs receive significantly more aid than non-LDCs (on a per capita or per
GDP basis), a larger share of aid, and substantial support through aid-for-trade pro-
grams (Alonso 2015; Calí and Te Velde 2011; Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, and
Rehwald 2017). It might well be the case that these mechanisms also help promote
exports beyond the effect of trade preferences.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Empirical strategy
To assess the impact of being designated an LDC on their exports, it is critical to identify
a control group including countries that are as similar as possible to LDCs, but are not
classified as LDCs. The identification of such a control group is possible since the rules
of inclusion and graduation are asymmetrical. In particular, a country needs to perform
poorly in all three criteria of the LDC classification, per capita income, human assets
index (HAI), and economic vulnerability index (EVI), to be included in the list. The
2018 inclusion thresholds are: GNI per capita of 1025 USD or less, HAI of 60 or less, and
EVI of 36 or more. For graduation, countries only have to be above the cut-offs in two
out of three criteria; moreover, the graduation cut-offs are 10 percent higher than the
inclusion cut-offs. For instance, the 2018 graduation thresholds are: GNI per capita of
1230 USD or more, HAI of 66 or higher, EVI of 32 or less. In addition, a country must
meet these graduation criteria for two consecutive triennial reviews, i.e. over six years,
and will then ordinarily graduate after three years, i.e. nine years after having met the
criteria for the first time. As a result, it is possible that a country A that happened not
to be on the list, has the same score as country B that is on the list. In particular, this
would be the case if countryA is not doing badly enough to be included on the list (i.e. is
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not below the lower inclusion cut-off in all three criteria) but would not have been well
enough to graduate (i.e. is not above the higher graduation cut-off in two out of the three
criteria).
It is important to point out that inclusion on the list, including the timing of inclusion,
is entirely criteria-driven. Changes in government, onset or end of civil wars, or other
events do not affect whether and when a country is added to the list unless a country
objects to being included which is very rare (see below). Recommendation for grad-
uation is also criteria-driven although the timing of graduation can be delayed at the
request of the CDP or the country concerned. This affects very few countries towards
the end of the period and all the countries that were granted a delay are not included in
our analysis (mainly due to lack of trade data or a very recent delay in graduation).
In order to identify such comparable countries, we look at the last four tri-annual
reviews (2006, 2009, 2012, 2015)16 to identify developing countries that are not on the
list of LDCs, but had they been on the list, would not havemet the criteria for graduation.
18 countries (listed below in Table 1) meet this condition and are therefore comparable
in the three LDC criteria to countries on the list.
One may ask why these 18 countries are not on the LDC list to begin with. Four rea-
sons play a role. Quantitatively, the most important reason is that some countries were
not doing poorly enough to be included on the original list in 1971 (either in terms
of income or education), but suffered from poor economic or education/health per-
formance since then so that they now perform similarly poorly as countries that were
initially placed on the list. However, these countries may not perform poorly enough
to meet the strict inclusion criteria and therefore were not placed on the list in the
1980s or 1990s. Most countries fall into this category, e.g. Cameroon, the Congo, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Swaziland, and Vietnam. India and Pakistan were never placed on the
list despite performing poorly on the income and human asset criterion for a long time
(from the 1970s to the early 2000s) because they never surpassed the economic vulner-
ability threshold necessary for inclusion. Nigeria was never listed as a LDC because the
CDPhad an additional inclusion criterion starting in the 1990s, whichwas that countries
should have less than 75 million people, which it had surpassed in the 1990s.17 Finally,
Ghana (in 1991), Papua New Guinea (in 2006 and 2009), and Zimbabwe (since 2006),
as a result of economic decline, actually met the inclusion criteria in the past, but their
governments did not consent to being listed as a LDC. The decision not to be included
on the LDC list was not based on assessments of possible trade benefits and other ben-
efits or costs. Instead, the respective governments did not want to be associated with a
list of countries that were the worst off in the world, and also because they often did not
want to acknowledge their country’s economic decline. Excluding these three countries
from the control group does not change the results.
To illustrate our point, consider Figure 1, which shows nominal GDP per capita in
US$ (using the Atlas method), the income indicator used for determining LDC status,
for five countries from 1965 to 2013. Zambia became an LDC in 1991, Burkina Faso and
Sudan have been LDCs since the beginning and Cameroon and Ghana are two coun-
tries that if they had been on the list in the last four tri-annual reviews, would not have
graduated in at least one of the criteria. The figure shows that the income levels of off-list
countries are similar and quite often below those of LDCs. One should also note, how-
ever, that there are some very poor LDCs, such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, that
are doing worse than most off-list countries (with the exception of Zimbabwe). Due to
these poorly performing LDCs, the average performance of LDCs on the LDC criteria is
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Figure 1. Per capita incomes, selected LDCs and off-list countries, 1965–2013.
worse than those of off-list countries. Thus, while we have created a much more compa-
rable group of countries through our procedure, we might still underestimate the effect
of LDC status under the assumption that poorer LDCs are less able to benefits from LDC
status. In a robustness check, we remove the worst-off LDCs (and Zimbabwe from the
off-list countries) to make the groups even more comparable.
A difference-in-difference analysis, comparing LDCs with this control group, is
applied to identify whether or not official LDC status benefits official LDCs in terms of
greater exports. In addition, in our specificationwith dyadic and exporter- and importer-
time fixed effects, we exploit information on countries added later on to the list as well as
countries graduating from the list. As shown in Table 1, 13 countries switched their sta-
tus, and we have trade data on both sides of the switch; 11 of those are countries placed
on the LDC list later on, while two are graduates from the list.
Apart from this analysis, we also compare LDCs with all non-LDC developing coun-
tries. To assess the impact of trade preferences as a transmission channel, individual
trade preference granters are also included in the analysis (US, Canada, EU, Norway,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey). In addition, the impact over the period of
trade preferences is briefly assessed.
Second, a dummy variable, ‘Trade Preferences’ (GSP), will be used to identify the exis-
tence of trade preferences. This dummy also proxies for special conditions concerning
tariff-quotas, voluntary export restraints, rules of origin, and non-tariff trade barriers in
the form of technical standards.
Third, LDC exports are compared with all non-LDC exports including the analysis
of the impact of trade preference schemes. The comparison with the more developed
non-LDCs will allow us to uncover the impact of tariff erosion, which can be the
result of multilateral tariff liberalization, bilateral free trade, and economic partnership
agreements that include non-LDCs.
3.2. Model specification: the augmented gravitymodel of trade
We analyze the impact of being an LDC and the trade preference-export relationship
within the framework of the gravity model of trade, for which theoretical founda-
tions have been developed over the past three decades by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand
(1985, 1989 and 1990), Helpman (1987), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra, Markusen, and
166 S. KLASEN ET AL.
Rose (2001), Anderson and VanWincoop (2003), Feenstra (2004), Haveman and Hum-
mels (2004) and Redding and Venables (2004) among others. Excellent reviews of recent
developments can be found inAnderson (2011), Head andMayer (2014), andYotov et al.
(2016).
Using this modeling framework we are able to evaluate and quantify the impact of
trade preferences on bilateral exports controlling for a variety of factors related to the
country’s business cycle, level of development, size, and policy factors that affect bilateral
trade. Anderson andVanWincoop (2003) contributed to this literature by deriving trade
costs from the gravity model and by suggesting how to model not only bilateral trade
costs but also trade costs from third countries, which clearly influence bilateral trade
costs. These relative costs are the so-called multilateral resistance terms (MRTs).
In our analysis, we use standard control variables of the gravitymodel (see Bergstrand
1985, 1989, 1990; Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003; Nelson and Juhasz Silva 2012;
Pettersson and Johansson 2013) and augment the model with variables that indicate
if a specific country has official LDC status and include controls that signal whether
a country enjoys a particular GSP status. In our preferred specification, we account for
time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity by using country-pair fixed effects. In addi-
tion, we include time-variant importer and exporter dummies in the model to account
for MRTs. Given the time span of our analysis, MRTs do not vary yearly, but every six
years. The main reason for this choice is twofold. First, we aim to identify the effect of
LDC status, and since this dummy is exporter specific and varies yearly, we will only be
able to identify this effect if we restrict the temporal variation of the MTRs to six-year
intervals. Second, MRTs account for trade costs relative to all trading partners and we
assume that these costs only vary substantially in the medium term.18
According to the underlying theory of the gravitymodel, trade between two countries
is explained by the nominal incomes of the trading countries, the distance between the
economic centers of the exporter and importer, and by several trade impediment and
facilitation variables. Geographical distance and a number of dummy variables, such as
having a common border, common language, common currency, free trade agreements;
and being a former colony, etc. are generally used as proxies for these factors. In our
setting, however, these variables are absorbed by dyadic fixed effects.
In order to study the impact of specific trade preference schemes on exports, we focus
on the role played by unilateral trade preferences (GSP) including EU, US, Canadian,
Japanese, Australian, New Zealand, Norwegian, and Turkish trade preference systems.
A comprehensive econometric version of the structural gravity model, augmented

















where t stands for the year and p for the timewindows used, i.e. the inclusion of dummies
that are country specific and vary every p years. Xijt is the export level from exporter
i to importer j over total exports from i to all destinations in period t in current US
dollars. Xit is total exports of country i at time t. We specify the dependent variable in
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shares XijtXit , instead of levels because the levels specification gives more importance to
large countries, whereas a shares specification gives equal weights to all countries. This
technique is known as Multinomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (MPML) based on
a multinomial distribution.19 Sotelo (2019) as well as Head and Mayer (2014) pointed
out that the implementation of the MPML estimator could be done by applying a PPML
estimator that uses trade shares as dependent variables.
Trading-partner (dyadic) fixed effects, δij, which proxy for time-invariant character-
istics in the relationship between i and j, are included to account for time-invariant
bilateral effects. This leads to the exclusion of time-invariant bilateral factors, namely
geographical distance, common border, common language, colonial relationship, etc.
The influence of variables that are bilateral and time-invariant cannot be directly
estimated when bilateral (dyadic) fixed effects are included.20
Exporter-time fixed effects (τip) and importer-time-fixed effects (ϕjp) proxy for all
sorts of trade barriers that are country specific and vary slowly over time. They control
for outward and inward multilateral resistance, i.e. trade barriers from third countries
that affect trade costs. We use six-year windows (p) for constructing exporter-time and
importer-time fixed effects, mainly to account for factors, such as institutions, infras-
tructure or cultural factors, which vary slowly over time. Yit (Yjt) indicates the GDP21 of
the exporter (importer).BTPh_ijt denotes time-variant bilateral factors, namely, common
membership in currency unions (CUijt), regional free trade agreements (RTAijt), and the
World Trade Organization (WTOijt). The variable GSP denotes different trade prefer-
ence dummies that can vary over time and that characterize k different trade preference
schemes (GSPk_ijt) relating to country-pair ij at time t.
The model is estimated for data on a maximum of 192 countries (for 184 of them
data on GSP schemes are available) over the period from 1973 to 2013. Panel fixed effect
techniques that are based on MPML are used.
3.3. Data and variables
We use bilateral trade data from 1973 to 2013 for aggregated and disaggregated exports
(1-digit level SITC 3) fromUN-COMTRADE. The products included in the sectors con-
sidered in the empirical analysis are listed in Table A.4 in the online Appendix. Data
on income variables are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators
Database, 2016). Distances between capitals are computed as great-circle distances using
data on straight-line distances in kilometers, latitudes and longitudes, trade impeding or
promoting factors, such as being a former colony and sharing a common language or a
common border, are taken from the CEPII database.22 GSP preference dummies were
kindly provided by Marco Wagner (Herz and Wagner 2011) and have been extended
until 2013 using information fromUNCTAD reports. RTA andWTOdummies are from
De Sousa (2012). The official LDC list and the characteristics of LDC countries are from
the UNDP. Summary statistics are shown in Table A.3 (online Appendix).
4. Main results
4.1. Results for LDCs and comparable countries
In this section, we start by comparing the exports of official LDC countries with
the exports of the control group, ‘off-LDC-list’ countries (see Table 1). This group is
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comprised of countries with a low-income level, a low level of human development, and
a high level of economic vulnerability, but which have not obtained LDC status for the
reasons discussed above.
The main results for the selected comparable developing countries as exporters are
presented in Table 2 for aggregated exports, building up from the most parsimonious
gravitymodel to our preferred specification.We start with a gravitymodel specified with
the usual bilateral trade cost proxies and origin and destination fixed effects in column
1, replace them with bilateral (dyadic) fixed effects in column 2, and with bilateral and
time-variant origin and destination fixed effects in column 3 (every 10 years), 4 (every
6 years) and 5 (every 5 years). The estimations contain common year fixed effects and
data for around 5900 country-pairs (column 2) for aggregate exports.
In column 1, the gravity model with exporter and importer fixed effects, the LDC
dummy is positive and significant. Adding further fixed effects does not change the
results much for the LDC dummy, as we can see comparing columns 3, 4, and 5 with
column 2.
Quantitatively, results in column 4 of Table 2 indicate that LDCs export 30%23 more
in total. This result, being the most conservative point estimate, seems quite large but
it should be noted that the levels of LDC exports, and thus the level of the depen-
dent variable (export shares) is quite low, only 0.04% for LDCs, so that a 30% increase
is quite possible (see Table A.3). The effect of preferences (GSP dummy variable) on
exports is mostly non-significant, however this is an average effect that could be hiding
heterogeneous effects across sectors or across preference regimes.
Table 2. LDCs & comparable ‘off-LDC-list’ countries as exporters, all importers.
Dep. Variable: Export shares (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed Effects Included: i,j,t ij, t ij, iy10, jy10 ij, iy6, jy6 ij, iy5, jy5
Ind. Variables:
Least Developed Country Status (LDC) 0.327*** 0.511*** 0.510*** 0.260** 0.460***
[0.0792] [0.0788] [0.121] [0.108] [0.0748]
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) −0.123 0.0822 −0.191** −0.159 0.0446
[0.0924] [0.0849] [0.0928] [0.144] [0.0797]
Ln Income Exporter 0.786*** 0.778*** 0.587*** 0.247*** 0.762***
[0.0711] [0.0659] [0.0718] [0.0831] [0.0630]
Ln Income Importer −0.185*** −0.184*** −0.440*** −0.00551 −0.192***
[0.0632] [0.0522] [0.0650] [0.0711] [0.0502]








Common Currency 0.879*** 0.0771 0.183 −0.247 0.0702
[0.110] [0.165] [0.359] [0.303] [0.146]
World Trade Organization 0.0808 0.151*** 0.0757 0.110* 0.140***
[0.0503] [0.0503] [0.0559] [0.0617] [0.0506]
Regional Trade Agreement 0.244*** 0.00902 0.108** 0.243*** 0.0377
[0.0530] [0.0530] [0.0532] [0.0602] [0.0519]
Pseudo-R Squared 0.391 0.431 0.441 0.444 0.440
Number of Observations 229,917 189,056 170,138 162,955 189,027
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country pair are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estima-
tion technique MPML with country pair and exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects (CPFE&CTFE). Export
share = exports from i to j as a ratio of total exports.
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Table 3. LDCs & comparable ‘off-LDC-list’ countries as exporters, all importers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)Dep. Variable




0.260** 0.168 −0.197 −0.258 0.952*** −0.0224 0.233 0.182
[0.108] [0.122] [0.122] [0.180] [0.202] [0.111] [0.204] [0.206]
Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP)
−0.159 0.239** 0.133* 0.289** −0.163 0.376*** 0.186 0.344***
[0.144] [0.0976] [0.0702] [0.114] [0.123] [0.120] [0.152] [0.125]
Ln Income Exporter 0.247*** 0.193** 0.0580 −0.137*** 0.112 0.433*** 0.547*** 0.224**
[0.0831] [0.0828] [0.0431] [0.0480] [0.0955] [0.107] [0.155] [0.0914]
Ln Income Importer −0.00551 0.0315 −0.0274 0.0886* 0.145* −0.138 0.0285 −0.0932
[0.0711] [0.0711] [0.0333] [0.0470] [0.0821] [0.0870] [0.133] [0.0768]
Common Currency −0.247 −0.0855 0.377 0.106 0.604* −1.400* −0.558 −0.329
[0.303] [0.275] [0.300] [0.264] [0.343] [0.735] [0.553] [0.480]
World Trade Organization 0.110* 0.110* −0.00678 −0.00735 0.101* 0.158** −0.0142 0.0624
[0.0617] [0.0600] [0.0414] [0.0591] [0.0600] [0.0797] [0.0780] [0.0838]
Regional Trade Agreement 0.243*** 0.359*** 0.226*** 0.172*** 0.230*** 0.405*** 0.137 0.236***
[0.0602] [0.0652] [0.0475] [0.0447] [0.0632] [0.0766] [0.0930] [0.0798]
Pseudo-R Squared 0.444 0.426 0.53 0.397 0.437 0.499 0.467 0.452
Number of Observations 162,955 162,365 127,875 120,067 122,369 76,272 107,199 119,248
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country pair are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. xtot = total
exports; xnoen = total exports without energy products; xmanu = manufactured exports; xrawm = rawmaterial exports;
xfood = agricultural exports; xche = exports of chemical products; xmachtr = exports ofmachinery and transport goods;
xotherm = exports of textiles and other manufactured goods. The controls include dyadic, exporter-6year-interval and
importer-6year-interval fixed effects (CPFE&CTFE). Estimation technique MPML with CPFE & CTFE.
In Table 3 we look at export shares and its components. Column 1 replicates our pre-
ferred specification for total exports, column 2 excludes energy (mineral fuels, lubricants
and related materials), and the most important sectors at the 2-digit SITC disaggrega-
tion level are shown in columns (3) to (8). It shows that LDC status leads to about 151%
more agriculture-related exports (column 4) than the control group. The coefficient of
the term GSP is positive, sizable, and significant in the case of non-fuel exports, but
not for agricultural exports. For manufacturing exports, the positive effects are due to
increases in raw materials, chemical goods and textiles, and other manufactured goods.
Therefore, it seems that the non-significance of the GSP term in Table 2 was due to the
inclusion of the energy sector.
Thus, while preferences for LDCsmatter in a quantitatively significant manner, being
an LDC has an additional positive effect on exports, possibly related to the other benefits
they receive (e.g. overall aid, aid for trade, or more generous implementation of existing
trade rules).
Meanwhile, the impact of belonging to a regional trade agreement (RTA) increases
total exports by 28%, manufactured exports by 25%, agriculture-related exports by 26%,
chemicals by 50%, and textile and other exports by around 27%. It is important to
note that LDCs differ in their competitiveness of different product categories, especially
agriculture and textile and the effect could also be heterogeneous between countries
depending on their comparative advantages.
4.2. Results for all countries
In this sub-section, we present the results obtained for thewhole sample of countries thus
comparing LDCswith all other exporting countries (non-LDCdeveloping countries and
170 S. KLASEN ET AL.
developed countries). As in the previous section, exports to other developing countries
and OECD countries are considered and we focus on the comparison between the GSP
regimes and official LDC status.
Table 4 looks at specific individual trade preference systems, different granters of trade
preferences: Canada (GSP_IM_CA), the US (GSP_IM_US), Australia (GSP_IM_AUT),
New Zealand (GSP_IM_NZ), Japan (GSP_IM_JAP), the EU (GSP_IM_EU), Norway
(GSP_IM_NOR), and Turkey (GSP_IM_TUR). We find that only Canadian and Aus-
tralian trade preference systems have a positive and statistically significant impact on
developing countries’ total exports: They increase imports into Canada by 116% and
into Australia by about 44%. In contrast, the trade preferences granted by all of the
other above-mentioned preference granters (US, New Zealand, Japan, EU, Norway and
Turkey) do not show a significant positive impact on the trade preferences of receiv-
ing countries’ total exports. However, the results shown in columns 2–8 indicate that
the coefficient of the GSP factor varies by sector. In particular, when energy exports are
excluded in column 2, the preferences granted by New Zealand and Japan also show a
positive impact on exports. Moreover, the GSP regimes of the EU and Turkey seems to
increase exports of manufactured goods (column 3) andmore specifically, of machinery
and transport the former and also of other manufactures the latter (columns 7 and 8).
Table 4. Results for all countries including specific non-reciprocal preference regimes.
Dep. Variable: Export shares: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ind. Variables: Xtot Xnoen Xmanu Xrawm Xfood Xche Xmachtr Xotherm
LDC Status 0.262** 0.171 0.112 −0.653** 1.008*** −0.0284 0.231 0.161
[0.122] [0.114] [0.128] [0.295] [0.208] [0.106] [0.207] [0.200]
GSP Canada 0.772*** 0.786*** 0.945*** 0.441*** 0.200** 0.180 1.057*** 0.471*
[0.181] [0.192] [0.320] [0.133] [0.0903] [0.179] [0.218] [0.272]
GSP United States −0.123** 0.0239 0.0217 0.132* 0.303*** 0.374*** 0.0633 −0.122**
[0.0620] [0.0514] [0.0582] [0.0698] [0.0773] [0.0865] [0.0699] [0.0614]
GSP Australia 0.362*** 0.426*** 0.386*** 0.312*** 0.642*** 0.146 0.316*** 0.408***
[0.0761] [0.0584] [0.0907] [0.0986] [0.108] [0.177] [0.121] [0.0810]
GSP New Zealand 0.0469 0.239*** −0.194*** −0.0640 0.141 −0.527*** −0.0823 −0.195**
[0.0884] [0.0591] [0.0672] [0.129] [0.115] [0.0947] [0.0755] [0.0947]
GSP Japan 0.133 0.452*** 0.466** −0.810*** −0.115 0.653** 0.469** 0.447***
[0.117] [0.165] [0.187] [0.132] [0.106] [0.306] [0.235] [0.160]
GSP European Union −0.00988 0.00697 0.0611** −0.127** −0.000694 −0.140*** 0.151*** 0.0180
[0.0274] [0.0245] [0.0269] [0.0571] [0.0400] [0.0411] [0.0423] [0.0302]
GSP Norway −0.111 −0.225 −0.372** 0.457*** 0.607*** 0.654*** −0.496** −0.166
[0.135] [0.138] [0.172] [0.128] [0.103] [0.204] [0.220] [0.195]
GSP Turkey 0.0743 0.0684 0.225*** −0.685*** −0.255** −0.138 0.462*** 0.164**
[0.0575] [0.0507] [0.0595] [0.104] [0.117] [0.110] [0.0850] [0.0708]
World Trade Organization 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.0847*** 0.445*** 0.384*** 0.106*** 0.0800*** 0.141***
[0.0264] [0.0238] [0.0267] [0.0483] [0.0335] [0.0332] [0.0270] [0.0307]
Common Currency 0.0243 0.0242* 0.0226 0.0229 0.0119 0.0522*** 0.0231 0.0168
[0.0158] [0.0145] [0.0163] [0.0251] [0.0189] [0.0179] [0.0203] [0.0172]
Regional Trade Agreement 0.150*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.207*** 0.124*** 0.0976*** 0.167***
[0.0121] [0.0113] [0.0130] [0.0180] [0.0144] [0.0150] [0.0155] [0.0139]
Observations 713,625 711,085 594,850 538,344 573,280 463,044 524,846 565,180
Pseudo-R Squared 0.399 0.406 0.421 0.404 0.393 0.408 0.436 0.421
Note: LDC = Least Developed Countries. GSP = Generalized System Preferences. Robust standard errors clustered by coun-
try pair are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; xtot = total exports; xnoen = total exports without energy
products; xmanu = manufactured exports; xrawm = rawmaterial exports; xfood = agricultural exports; xche = exports
of chemical products; xmachtr = exports of machinery and transport goods; xotherm = exports of textiles and otherman-
ufactured goods. Estimation technique MPML with CPFE & CTFE. The coefficients of income variables are not reported to
save space.
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Food exports seem to benefit from the GSP regimes of Canada, US, Australia, and Nor-
way (column 6). In short, the impact of preference regimes is sector-specific and depends
on the conditions of the granting country, as could be expected.
With respect to the role of LDC status, we find that it has a positive and statistically
significant effect on total exports leading to an increase of 30%. More specifically, agri-
cultural exports increase by 174% and they seem to drive the result for total exports.
The estimates differ only slightly from Table 3 where the impact on total exports is an
increase of 30%, and 159% for food exports.
In terms of additional control variables, we observe that several factors promote total
exports (col. 1) in a statistically significant way. If both countries share a common cur-
rency (comcur), the exporting country’s exports increases in a non-significant way, and
if both parties belong to a regional trade agreement (RTA), they export 16%more and if
they both belong to the WTO, exports increase by 19%.
4.3. Extensions and robustness
As a first extension, we focus on country characteristics of LDCs using the reduced
sample of LDCs and comparable countries in Table 5. We differentiate between LDCs
that are regular exporters (category omitted), big exporters (LDC_bigexp) and small
exporters (LDC_sids, including islands, landlocked and very small countries; see Table
1 for the classification). Looking at the coefficients belonging to the big exporters among
the LDCs, we find clear evidence that the big exporters are much more successful than
the off-list countries in terms of agriculture-related exports.
Table 6 shows that LDC status did not help LDCs to export more in the period
1973–1990. Trade preferences for LDCs in combination with LDC status have only
Table 5. LDCs and comparable ‘off-LDC-list’ countries as exporters.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable (export shares): Xnoen Xmanu Xfood Xotherm
Ind. Variables:
LDC Big Exporters 0.177 −0.195 0.987*** 0.180
[0.123] [0.123] [0.214] [0.207]
LDC Small Islands −0.680 −2.903*** 0.358 −1.469
[0.545] [0.800] [0.964] [1.236]
Ln Income Exporter 0.231*** 0.0550 0.131 0.239***
[0.0805] [0.0423] [0.0938] [0.0900]
Ln Income Importer 0.0118 −0.0232 0.132* −0.0853
[0.0679] [0.0327] [0.0789] [0.0738]
Common Currency 0.232 0.211 0.725** −0.175
[0.268] [0.276] [0.299] [0.483]
World Trade Organization 0.115* −0.00623 0.101* 0.0546
[0.0598] [0.0414] [0.0595] [0.0830]
Regional Trade Agreement 0.365*** 0.222*** 0.243*** 0.253***
[0.0622] [0.0463] [0.0605] [0.0781]
Constant −9.659*** −1.979*** −9.362*** −7.104***
[1.272] [0.733] [1.463] [1.562]
Observations 194,970 148,808 137,160 136,926
Pseudo-R Squared 0.432 0.537 0.440 0.458
Note: LDC denotes Least Developed Countries. Robust standard errors clustered by country pair are in brackets
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. LDC-regular exporters is the left-out category. Estimation technique MPML
with CPFE & CTFE.
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Table 6. The impact of trade preferences over time for all countries.
Period 1973–1990 Period 1991–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)Dep. Variable




−0.794 −0.824 −0.236 −0.827 0.277** 0.215 1.146*** 0.525***
[0.428] [0.523] [0.428] [0.552] [0.126] [0.137] [0.257] [0.200]
Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP)
−0.0142 0.732*** −0.470*** 0.607*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.0948*** 0.0206
[0.0804] [0.123] [0.0708] [0.105] [0.0203] [0.0224] [0.0290] [0.0252]
Ln Income Exporter 0.101*** 0.0184 0.126*** −0.0960*** 0.149*** 0.173*** 0.0651*** 0.134***
[0.0182] [0.0216] [0.0304] [0.0237] [0.0191] [0.0202] [0.0248] [0.0213]
Ln Income Importer −0.0498***−0.0138 −0.0611** 0.0478 −0.0808***−0.0931***−0.0394* −0.0816***
[0.0181] [0.0259] [0.0297] [0.0301] [0.0147] [0.0154] [0.0203] [0.0179]
Common Currency 0.0815 −0.299* 0.127 −0.389** 0.0658*** 0.0359** 0.199*** 0.0463**
[0.0801] [0.175] [0.100] [0.193] [0.0160] [0.0174] [0.0240] [0.0198]
World Trade Organization 0.00769 0.0234 0.0793 0.0545 −0.00863 −0.00667 0.000926 −0.0257
[0.0438] [0.0544] [0.0532] [0.0587] [0.0148] [0.0160] [0.0183] [0.0169]
Regional Trade Agreement 0.100*** 0.0351 0.257*** 0.0811** 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.119***
[0.0235] [0.0388] [0.0334] [0.0386] [0.0131] [0.0136] [0.0171] [0.0149]
Constant −3.939*** −2.250*** −4.265*** −0.674 −4.959*** −5.244*** −3.531*** −4.318***
[0.392] [0.544] [0.634] [0.585] [0.367] [0.395] [0.443] [0.396]
Observations 146,027 87,291 109,788 81,263 452,174 426,258 380,462 409,729
Pseudo-R Squared 0.399 0.423 0.373 0.402 0.386 0.398 0.385 0.405
Note: LDC = Least Developed Countries. GSP = Generalized System Preferences. Robust standard errors clustered by
country pair are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; xtot = total exports; xmanu = manufactured exports;
xfood = agricultural exports; xotherm = exports of textiles and other manufactured goods. Estimation technique MPML
with CPFE & CTFE.
become effective in the period 1991–2013 (columns 5–8). This is to be expected as pref-
erence schemes targeting LDCs were only established starting in the 1990s (Guillamont,
2009). Also, poor countries have increasingly been integrated into global value chains
in agricultural and some manufacturing products, and LDCs appear to have benefited
from that. Moreover, in the 1990s and 2000s, being on the list of LDCs independently
of being GSP beneficiaries is also associated with higher manufactured goods exports,
agricultural exports, textiles, and othermanufactured goods. In addition, receiving non-
reciprocal preferences contributed to promoting total exports, manufacturing exports,
and food exports. Hence, in the period 1991–2013, both LDC status and availability of
trade preferences contributed to the promotion of exports.
As a third robustness check, we estimated the model for an alternative control group
using quantitative criteria to select the control group. To construct the control group,
we first selected countries that were within 10% of the graduation threshold from 2003-
onwards.We then included the countries that in any of the triennial reports (2003, 2006,
2009, 2012) were within the given 10% of the graduation threshold levels (per capita
income < 1500, human assets < 73, and economic vulnerability > 35). In this way we
arrive at the list we use in Tables 2 and 3, but excluding Kenya and India. We have there-
fore re-estimated the model excluding Kenya and India and the results, which do not
practically differ from those in Table 3, are shown in Table A.5 (online Appendix).
Next, we estimate themodel for all countries and total exports for the 2000s (see Table
A.6 in the online Appendix). We investigate whether preferences have eroded in recent
years due to the ratification of numerous RTAs.
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We find a diminishing impact of preferences granted by Canada and Australia and
even a total erosion of the ones granted by New Zealand, Japan, and EU. The Cana-
dian GSP impact declines drastically for total exports and becomes negative (column
(2)) for total exports and remains positive but much smaller for non-energy exports.
Interestingly, Turkish GSP preferences become effective only in the 2000s.
The diminished impact of Canada’s GSPs and the erosion of the impact of Aus-
tralia’s GSPs are likely correlated with an expansion of product coverage and lower tariff
rates in response to the signing of many bilateral trade agreements, which also benefited
industrialized and non-LDC developing countries.
Between 2009 and 2012, Canada concluded several bilateral trade agreements, e.g.
with Panama, Jordan,Colombia, Peru, and the EuropeanFreeTradeAssociation (EFTA).
Australia signed the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement in 2010. A
further erosion of Australia’s GSPs is to be expected as Australia signed bilateral trade
agreements with China (2015), Japan (2015) and South Korea (2014).
In 2015, Australia signed the so-called Australia-Transpacific Partnership Agree-
ment, which covers Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand,
Singapore, US, and Vietnam.
The ineffectiveness of non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU could be
due to the heterogeneity of the preference regimes with different developing countries.
Another factor could be that only a quarter of LDCs enjoy nameable (in terms of prod-
ucts exported) trade preferences, which are relevant when taking their export value into
account (see Table A.1 in the online Appendix from Brenton (2003)). To test this argu-
ment, we have also estimated the model for specific preference schemes (see Table A.7,
online Appendix). The results for GSP Plus and for EBA show some positive effects
for manufacturing exports, in particular for raw materials and food (GSP Plus) and for
machinery and other manufacturing including textile and footwear (EBA).
Finally, as discussed above, while the off-list countries are very similar to LDCs that
are close to the graduation threshold, they may be systematically better off than the
worst off LDCs that are far from graduation. To further investigate this, we removed
the worst off LDCs to make the groups even more comparable. In the sub-sample analy-
sis, we remove Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Sudan, and Togo from the LDC list and Zimbabwe from the off-list countries. The
results are shown in Table A.8 in the online Appendix and are comparable to those in
Table 3. The restricted sample confirms our previous findings and the coefficients for
the LDC status variable are very similar to those found in Table 3; however, they show a
slightly highermagnitude as expected. Thus, we find that the effect of LDC status among
the most comparable group is statistically significant, substantial, and robust.
5. Conclusions
We find that LDC status (compared to non-LDC status) grants LDCs a large advan-
tage, as far as total exports and agricultural exports are concerned. This effect tends
to be larger when a trade preference scheme is not operating effectively. We argue that
LDC status is helpful in promoting exports because it potentially reduces the uncertainty
attached to a particular GSP regime, which is revised periodically and depends on the
decision of the granters, whereas graduation from LDC status is very unlikely to happen
in the short run and must be confirmed by the UN.
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In addition, we found that the trade preference schemes are effective in some cases,
in the sense that the GSP systems promote exports from developing countries (LDCs
and non-LDCs), but the results are heterogeneous and vary depending on the country
offering the preferences and on the sector of exports considered.
When we compare the export effect of trade preferences for LDCs with that for
‘off-LDC-list’ developing countries (untreated LDCs), a substantial export advantage
ranging from 30% (for total exports) to more than 159% (for food and agricultural
exports) for LDCs is noticeable. In addition, differentiating among LDC exporters by
country size, geographic location, and export strength shows that big exporters have a
large export advantage for food products compared to off-LDC-list countries and the
regular and island LDCs. The main limitation of our empirical application is that the
identification strategy of the export effect of LDC status relies on a limited number of
switchers, that is, countries that move onto and off of the official list. For this reason,
a more detailed analysis using highly disaggregated trade data is still needed and is an
area for future research. It will also allow for the inclusion of product-level data into the
analysis and allow for a cleaner identification strategy.
In terms of policy, on the one hand, our results suggest that LDC status seems to gen-
erate important benefits. On the other hand, it implies that graduating countries face the
threat of declining exports. This is potentially a serious problem as the number of coun-
tries that are becoming or will soon become eligible for graduation is currently rapidly
increasing. Ten LDCs have been identified for graduation in the coming five years and
more are likely to move towards graduation soon, including countries that are major
exporters of manufactured goods and benefit a great deal from trade preferences, such
as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Myanmar. For these countries, a smooth transition to
non-LDC status, which should involve a slow winding down of trade preferences and
other benefits over many years, will be critical.
Notes
1. The 2018 LDC identification criteria are available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/
least-developed-country-category/ldc-criteria.html.
2. The loss of LDC-specific preferential treatment in the G20 countries is estimated to be equivalent
to a 3–4 percent reduction in merchandise export revenues (UNCTAD 2016, 17).
3. See Guillamont (2009) for details on the inclusion and graduation criteria and their changes over
time.
4. The list includes Equatorial Guinea, which graduated in 2017, and South Sudan, whichwas included
in 2012.
5. As argued above, the LDC category might promote their exports through other mechanisms, such
as more preferential aid, more lenient treatment in the enforcement of trade regulations as well as
other bilateral andmultilateral supportmeasures that lead to increased exports. Thus, it is important
to assess the complete impact of LDC status on trade.
6. For a complete list see http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx.
7. As cited in Harrison (2014).
8. tMFN is the tariff under Most Favoured Nations treatment; tTP is the tariff under the relevant trade
preference scheme.
9. A summary of themain empirical findings of specific studies on EU andUS trade preferences can be
found in the online Appendix in Table A.2 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343995454_
Online_Appendix_Does_the_Designation_of_Least_Developed_Country_Status_Promote_
Exports/).
10. They also show robustness checks with fixed effects LS (dyadic effects) and year dummies.
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11. They usually include country-year fixed effects for exporters and importers (in the main results
with a Heckman approach) and country-pair (dyadic) effects in the robustness checks with PPML.
In order to reduce the amount of dummy variables, they use data with 4 year intervals.
12. Since first difference regressions reflect short-run development, a value of 91% seems to be unreal-
istic. Values computed by the Heckman or PPML approach produce more plausible figures in the
range of around a 30 percent increase in exports.
13. Other developed countries also apply some graduation rules. For instance, EU standard GSP and
GSP+ are subject to income and product graduation (Stevens et al. 2011).
14. The total costs of border formalities – in order to determine the origin of a product – are in the range
of 3% to 6% of the total export value of a product (Inama 2003; Mohan, Khorana, and Choudhury
2012).
15. The timeline of a country’s graduation is available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/
least-developed-country-category/ldc-graduation.html.
16. Going back further is difficult as the criteria have changed slightly over time and data is not available
for earlier years. Since most developing countries also recorded economic growth and improve-
ments in education and health in the 1990s, going back further (i.e. to a time when they were
poorer and education andhealthwereworse)would be very unlikely to change the list of comparator
countries.
17. The argument was that more populous countries would be better able to deal with their structural
handicaps. Surpassing 75 million does not lead to graduation, however, which is why Bangladesh
and Ethiopia are still LDCs.
18. As robustness checks, we vary the frequency of the time-country dummies and the results remain
similar, with the only exception being agricultural exports, for which the LDC dummy coefficient
has a much higher magnitude when using six-year intervals.
19. Aswith themore popular Poisson PseudoMaximumLikelihood (PPML),MPML also yields consis-
tent estimates of the first-moment parameters, provided that the conditional expectation is correctly
specified (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984; Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo 2013; Sotelo 2019).
20. A traditional gravitymodel including the usual ‘gravity’ variableswas also estimated for comparative
purposes. Results are available upon request.
21. We utilize GDP rather than GNP in order to avoid counting income received by third countries
(international transfer payments such as aid) twice.
22. http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/fdi.html. These variables are used to estimate a traditional
gravity model for comparative purposes (see Table 2, columns 1 and 2).
23. [(exp(0.260)−1)*100%].
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